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Fox v. Fox
[42 C.2d 49; 265 P.2d 881]

[L. A. No. 22431.

In Bank.

Jan. 8, 1954.]

LILLIAN R. FOX, Respondent, v. WILLIAM J. FOX,
Appellant.
[1] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.-\Vhere provisions for support and maintenance of wife
are an integral and inscvcrablc part of a property settlement
agreement, her express promise not to seek alimony other
than as provided in such agreement cannot be abrogated
without changing the agreement.
[2] Husband and Wife-Transactions Inter Se-Property Settlement Agreements-Interpretation.-In absence of conflicting
extrinsic evidence, interpretation placed on a property settlement agreement by trial court is not binding on Supreme
Court on appeal.
[3] !d.-Transactions Inter Se-Property Settlement Agreements
-Interpretation.-Labels adopted by parties to a property
settlement agreement, such as that monthly payments provided therein are alimony, are not conclusive, since agreement must be considered as a whole.
[4] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.-To the extent that monthly payments provided for in
a property settlement agreement are designed to discharge
obligation of support and maintenance of wife, they will
ordinarily have some of indicia of alimony, although they
may not in fact be alimony.
[5] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.The fact that monthly payments provided for in a property
settlement agreement for support and maintenance of wife
might be reduced under certain specified circumstances does
not indicate that they were alimony.
[6] Husband and Wife-Transactions Inter Se-Property Settlement Agreements- Interpretation.- Provisions for support
and maintenance of wife may be included in agreements that
are solely property settlements, and where they expressly
provide that in no event are the payments to fall below a
designated sum per month and are to cease on a fixed date
without reference to wife's needs or husband's ability to pay
after that time, they lend support to conclusion that at
[3] See Cal.Jur., Husband and Wife, § 44 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Husband and Wife, § 264.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4, 5] Divorce, § 203; [2, 3] Husband and Wife, §157(6); [6] Husband and Wife, §§157, 157(6);
[7] Divorce, § 180 (4).
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least part of payments constitute a division of property as
such.
[7] Divorce-Counsel Fees-Effect of Agreement Between Spouses.
-Where property settlement agreement contains waiver by
wife of all attorney fees other than $300 provided in such
agreement, and its validity has been adjudicated in divorce
action, trial court errs in awarding fees in violation of its
terms.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County increasing monthly payments for support
and maintenance of divorced wife and awarding attorney
fees. Otto J. Emme, Judge. Reversed.
Wright, Wright, Green & Wright, Loyd Wright, Charles
A. Loring and Dudley K. Wright for Appellant.
Stahlman & Cooper and \¥allace E. Wolfe for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-In1947, plaintiff :filed an action for divorce
against defendant on the ground of extreme cruelty and
prayed for a division of the community property and alimony. Thereafter the parties executed a separation agreement, and plaintiff amended her complaint to allege that by
the terms of the agreement ''all of the community property
and rights therein and rights of support have been adjusted,
settled and compromised." She prayed that "the Court
approve and incorporate in the decree the terms of that
certain Agreement and Property Settlement made, executed
and entered into by the Plaintiff and Defendant on the 13th
day of April, 1948, and require by the terms of its decree
that the Defendant comply with the terms in said decree
for him to be performed.'' Defendant defaulted, and an
interlocutory decree was entered approving the agreement
and expressly incorporating the provisions for the payment
of alimony, which defendant was ordered to perform. The
final decree was entered one year later. In 1952, plaintiff
petitioned the court to increase the monthly payments from
$400 to $700 per month on the ground of changed circumstances and requested attorney fees for presenting her motion.
After a hearing the court entered its order increasing the
monthly payments to $500 per month and awarding $100
attorney fees, and defendant has appealed.
Defendant contends that, although the monthly payments
were labeled alimony both in the agreement and in the decree
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based thereon, it is clear from an examination of the agreement as a whole that the provision for them was an integral
of a property settlement agreement and may not therefore be modified. We agree with this contention.
In their agreement the parties recited that they desired
finally to settle all of their property rights and stated that
"in consideration of the premises and of the covenants, agreements, releases, waivers and transfers herein made and herein
agreed to be made by the parties hereto, one to the other,
it has been and is hereby agreed between the parties as
follows: . . .
''THIRD: It is understood and agreed that this settlement
is to obtain at all times between the parties hereto regardless
of any change in the marital relations between them and the
happening of any other event shall not abrogate or affect
this instrument.
"FoUR'l'H: Nothing in this agreement shall be construed
as precluding either party from bringing or defending or
appearing in any suit for divorce, and in the event a divorce
be granted to either party, this agreement may be incorporated in and become a part of any such decree of divorce
entered . . . .
'' SrxTH: Husband agrees to pay to the wife, as alimony,
the sum of four hundred dollars ($400) per month, commencing May 12th, 1948, and continuing thereafter to and
including the month of December, 1953, (except as otherwise herein provided) at which time all obligation on the
part of the husband to make the aforesaid or any other
payments to the wife for her support shall thereupon terminate."
The agreement then provided that payments for the support of the wife should terminate if she should remarry before
December 31, 1953, and that after her remarriage or December 31, 1953, whichever occurred earlier, the husband
should pay her $100 per month for the support of each of the
two minor children of the parties. It also provided that if
the husband's United States disability pension should be
reduced, the support payments should be reduced $3.33 for
each $10 reduction in the pension. In no event, however,
was the wife to receive less than $200 per month.
The seventh, eighth and ninth paragraphs provided for a
detailed division of the community property, including the
payment of $8,000 cash to the wife, and adjusted rights with
respect to insurance policies and a retirement fund.
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The tenth paragraph provided: "I-I usband agrees to pay
Blanche & Fueller, attorneys for the wife, as their attorneys'
fees, the sum of three hundred dollars ($300) of which
amount one hundred fifty dollars ( $150) shall be payable
upon the execution of this agreement by the parties hereto
and the remaining one hundred fifty dollars ($150) of which
shall be payable on or before ninety ( 90) days from date
hereof. In consideration of the agreement of the husband
to pay the aforesaid fees, the wife hereby agrees that in any
action for divorce or separate maintenance between the
parties hereto, whether the same be now pending or hereafter
commenced, she will not make application for or seek to
require the payment of any attorneys' fees whatsoever by
the husband and that she will likewise pay such costs of
suit involved in any such action herself and shall not call
upon the husband to pay any part thereof.
''The wife further agrees that she will not, in any such
action, apply for or seek from the husband any payment of
alimony or support money for the children of the parties
except in accordance with the provisions of this agreement.''
[1] In this case, as in Dexter v. Dexter, ante, p. 36
[265 P.2d 873], it is clear that the provisions for the
support and maintenance of plaintiff are an integral and
inseverable part of the property settlement agreement of
the parties. The parties stated that they desired to effect
a final settlement that would ''obtain at all times between''
them and expressly provided that the agreement was made
in consideration of "the premises, and of the covenants,
agreements, releases, waivers, and transfers herein made and
herein agreed to be made." Thus plaintiff's express promise
not to seek alimony other than as provided in the agreement,
cannot now be abrogated without changing the property settlement agreement of the parties.
Plaintiff contends, however, that since the payments were
labeled alimony, were to cease on her remarriage, and were
subject to modification in the event of a reduction of defendant's pension, there is evidence to support the trial court's
implied :finding that they were solely alimony subject to
modification. [2] In the absence of conflicting extrinsic
evidence, the interpretation placed upon the agreement by
the trial court is not binding on this court on appeal. (Estate
of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343, 352 [131 P.2d 825]; Lane v. Lane,
117 Cal.App.2d 247, 251 [255 P.2d 110]; see, also, Gosnell v.
Webb, 60 Cal.App.2d 1, 4 [139 P.2d 985] ; Miranda v. Mi-
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-------------------------------------------------randa, 81 Cal.App.2d 61, 69 [183 P.2d 61].) [3] The
labels adopted by the parties are not conclusive, since the
agreement must be considered as a whole. (Tuttle v. Tuttle,
38 Cal.2d 419, 422 [240 P.2d 587] ; Puckett v. Puckett, 21
Cal.2d 833, 842 [136 P.2d 1] ; Rich v. Rich, 44 Cal.App.2d
526, 530 [112 P.2d 780].) [4] Moreover, as pointed out
in the Dexter case, to the extent the monthly payments are
designed to discharge the obligation of support and maintenance, they will ordinarily have some of the indicia of
alimony. [5] Similarly, the fact that the payments might
be reduced under certain specified circumstances does not
indicate that they were alimony. [6] Not only may the
parties include such provisions in agreements that are admittedly solely property settlements (Hogarty v. Hogarty,
188 Cal. 625, 628 [206 P. 79]), but the provision in this case
lends support to the conclusion that at least part of the
payments constituted a division of property as such. Thus
in no event vvere the payments to fall below $200 per month,
and they were to cease on a fixed date without reference
to plaintiff's needs or defendant's ability to pay after that
time.
[7] The award of attorney fees was contrary to plaintiff's
waiver of all fees other than the $300 provided for in the
agreement. Since plaintiff has never attacked the agreement,
and since its validity has been adjudicated in the divorce
action, the trial court erred in awarding fees in violation
of its terms. (Patton v. Patton, 32 Cal.2d 520, 523-525
[196 P.2d 909]; Viera v. Viera, 107 Cal.App.2d181, 183-184
[236 P.2d632] .)
The order is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in
the judgment reversing the order, but I disagree with some
of the reasoning leading thereto.
In this case the parties had agreed that certain payments
were to be made to the plaintiff; the portion of this agreement referring to said payments was incorporated in the
decree of divorce. Upon application for modification, plaintiff
wife was granted an increase in the monthly payments as
well as additional attorneys' fees. Plaintiff contended that
there was evidence to sustain the trial court's implied finding
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that the payments were intended solely as alimony subject
to modification. This court, in the majority opinion, says:
''In the absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence, the interpretation placed upon the agreement by the trial court is
not binding on this court on appeal.'' In effect, the majority
is saying that there was insufficient evidence to support the
trial court's implied finding that the payments were alimony
and not a part of a property settlement agreement. This
result flows naturally from its determination that the payments were part of a property settlement agreement.
This case, as well as the Dexter and Flynn cases, has run
the full judicial gamut provided for in this state. This
unnecessary and costly procedure could be avoided in the
future if the rule were settled that where parties have agreed
upon a division of their property, or for support and maintenance for one of them, and that agreement is found by
the court in the divorce action to be fair and equitable, and
approved by it, their agre.ement is considered as the sum of
their rights and liabilities and is not subject to modification
in the absence of a provision in the agreement to that effect.
This is as it should be and would provide the necessary
measure of stability in such cases. I have, in my dissents in
the Flynn and Dexter cases, set forth the reasons for such
a rule and the necessity for it in that parties, and their
attorneys, should be able to rely upon the proposition that
property and support rights arising out of the termination
of a marital relationship once settled by agreement should
remain settled and courts should not be called upon to decide
whether the payments provided for are alimony or a part
of a property settlement. As I said in my dissent in the
Dexter case, when the parties have settled their property
and support rights and liabilities by agreement which has
been approved by the trial court as fair and equitable, the
question as to the character of any payments to be made
should be forever closed to inquiry. Whether or not the
provisions of the agreement are incorporated in the decrees
of divorce should only affect the remedy to be pursued in
the event of a failure to comply therewith.
Because the parties hereto agreed for Rpecific payments to
be made and received and because plaintiff waived all rights
to any other attorneys' fees than those set forth in the agreement, I would reverse the order appealed from.

